I. Introduction
The awarding of arbitration costs and attorneys' fees in international arbitrations is often arbitrary and unpredictable. In one recent investment arbitration where the tribunal deciding a case under the auspices of the international Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) had broad discretion to award costs and fees, the tribunal allocated arbitration costs evenly amongst the claimant and respondent and required each party to bear its own fees and expenses, even though the claimant prevailed. 1 In another case where the claimant was successful on its substantive claim, the ICSID tribunal ordered the respondent to pay the claimant US$6 million for legal fees, but required the parties to bear the costs of the arbitration equally. 2 And in still another recent investment arbitration the unsuccessful respondent was ordered to pay the costs of the arbitration, but each party was responsible for its own legal fees. 3 These results are not unique to investment arbitrations; they can also be found in international commercial arbitrations. 4 The lack of uniformity in the awarding of costs and fees poses two major problems. First, arbitrary awards undermine the legitimacy of the dispute resolution system. Second, the lack of predictability may hinder parties from being able to settle the dispute and could rob arbitration of its efficiency. These problems are exacerbated in the international context because the costs and fees in transnational disputes can run into the millions of dollars. Indeed, in one recent celebrated arbitration, the costs and fees totaled over US$21 million.
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This contribution to the liber amicorum examines the awarding of costs and fees in international arbitrations. As the work of Bernardo Cremades has focused on both international commercial arbitration and transnational investment disputes, this paper compares the practice of awarding costs and fees under each. My study finds that awards of costs and fees are arbitrary and unpredictable under both systems. To remedy these problems, I propose two different approaches: one for ICSID tribunals and another for international commercial arbitrations. In the case of ICSID arbitrations, I advocate that the institution adopt a default rule providing for the parties to share equally the costs of the arbitration and bear their own legal expenses. In essence, I propose that ICSID adopt what has become known as the American Rule with respect to the awarding of costs and fees. This approach is needed to bring predictability to the field, provide greater administrative efficiency, and reduce the overall costs. In the case of international commercial arbitrations, I argue that parties should be free to select the method for resolving claims for costs and fees, including authorizing the tribunal to resolve such claims pursuant to the principle of "costs follow the event" or the "loser pays" rule. In this context, the adoption of the American Rule would not achieve the same administrative and economic benefits, and the principle of party autonomy calls for this different approach.
II. Overview

A. Defining Costs and Fees in International Arbitrations
The costs of international arbitration are two-fold and consist of the costs of the proceeding and the costs of the parties. 6 The proceeding's costs generally include administrative fees, tribunal fees, and costs associated with the tribunal. The parties' costs are principally comprised of legal costs: attorneys' fees, expert fees and related expenses.
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Administrative fees involve filing costs and the tribunal's fees and expenses. In general, these expenses are greater for arbitrations than for court proceedings because the State subsidizes costs for the latter. 8 For example, the administrative fees for a US$10 million dispute before the equivalent to one-third of the amount claimed in the action. 32 In other countries, such as Germany, the amount of fees that may be awarded is set pursuant to a mandatory schedule.
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Many countries extend the CFE method to arbitration. 34 For example, laws in England and Mexico state that the tribunal should award costs according to CFE. 35 Specifically, the English Arbitration Act provides "unless the parties otherwise agree, the tribunal shall award costs on the general principle that costs should follow the event except where it appears to the tribunal that this principle is not appropriate in relation to the whole or part of the costs."
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The CFE method is also incorporated into many arbitral rules. For instance, the
Arbitration Rules of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL)
state that the arbitration costs "shall in principle be borne by the unsuccessful party" tribunal;
however, the tribunal has broader discretion in allocating legal costs. 37 Similarly, the LCIA Rules gives the tribunal the authority to shift costs and stipulates that awards should be proportioned based on the relative successes of the parties.
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Other rules, while not explicitly granting cost shifting, authorize tribunals to do so. 1996) (providing that in the absence of a contrary agreement, "the tribunal shall award costs on the general principle that costs should follow the event except where it appears to the tribunal that in the circumstances this is not appropriate in relation to the whole or part of the costs"); Cod.Com., art. 1454 (Mex.) (stating that, subject to exceptions, the costs of the arbitration shall be borne by the losing party). 36 See English Arbitration Act (1996) Section 61(2). 37 See UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, Art.40(1), available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/arb-rules/arb-rules.pdf. 38 See London Court of International Arbitration (LCIA) Rules art. 28.4 provides:
Unless the parties otherwise agree in writing, the Arbitral Tribunal shall make its order on both arbitration and legal costs on the general principle that costs should follow the result of the award or arbitration except where it appears to the Arbitral Tribunal that in the particular circumstances this approach is inappropriate.
for the use of the facility for the Centre." 39 Additionally, although the ICC Rules do not recommend a basis for awarding costs, they do give the tribunal the discretion to allocate expenses.
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The American Rule
In contrast to the CFE approach, the American Rules provides for each party to pay for its own expenses. 41 This approach is mainly followed in the U.S. 42 When the U.S. Supreme Court adopted the American Rule in 1796, it set forth three reasons for the practice. 43 First, such an award may be viewed as punishing losing parties, which may be unfair because legal outcomes are uncertain. Second, increasing the losing parties' costs may deter the poor from bringing suit. Third, shifting costs may increase time, expense and the difficulty of proof.
However, even in the U.S., the American Rule is far from absolute. 44 As the United States Supreme Court recently noted, predictability is essential to a fair and well functioning adjudicatory system. 85 This is especially true with respect to international arbitration. To the extent that results are unpredictable, parties may view arbitration as unfair and fail to choose it as a means of resolving disputes. 86 In addition, lack of predictability discourages parties from settling cases and thus reduces the efficiency of the system. 87 As one commentator explained:
[I]t must be a prerequisite to any international arbitration that the parties know
well in advance what to budget for costs, and that the cost system of the administering institution is fully transparent from the outset, so that clients and their counsel know how their money will be spent and if they can expect to recoup it fully or in part. Furthermore, a party should be in a position to reasonably predict the level of financial risk that it will incur in an arbitration, and the conditions it needs to satisfy to make a good claim for costs…. Knowing the mechanisms of a given arbitration cost system, and the impact of its application … may … help a party decide in a particular case whether it should file counterclaims, advance the arbitration costs in lieu of the other party, or simply discontinue the proceedings. 88 Moreover, the lack of predictability hinders counsel from advising clients on the most prudent course of action. These problems are exacerbated in investment arbitrations, where parties on average spend millions of dollars to resolve a dispute before ICSID and awards are often published.
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I believe that these problems can be remedied in investment arbitrations by the adoption of a default rule 90 that provides for the parties to divide equally the costs of the arbitration and for each to bear its own attorneys' fees and costs. 91 In other words, I propose that ICSID tribunals essentially follow the American Rule. Four reasons support this proposal.
First and foremost, it would provide a clear rule, thus bringing much needed predictability to the area. While the CFE method has in theory the benefit of making a party whole for the expense in prosecuting or defending valid claims, its administration is premised on subjective criteria and broad discretion on the part of tribunals. 92 This deficiency has ultimately resulted in similarly situated parties being treated differently. 93 Thus, the need for a bright line rule outweighs the theoretical benefit of the CFE approach -to make the prevailing party whole for the costs of litigating.
Second, along the same lines, this practice would provide greater administrative efficiency. Adopting the American Rule would eliminate the need for parties to brief and argue the issues of costs and fees and, correspondingly, tribunals would not need to devote time to determining whether a party "won" and how much it should award to the successful party in costs and fees.
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Third, adopting this method may have the effect of reducing the overall costs of resolving disputes before ICSID. 95 As commentators have pointed out, in contrast to the American Rule, the CFE method gives the parties the incentive to spend more money because larger damages at stake. 96 Under the CFE method, parties' costs theoretically increase as they take into account the 93 Susan Franck notes that inconsistent ruling may lead parties to believe that they are being treated unfairly. She supports treating similar cases the same because "it promotes perceptions of fairness and supports the legitimacy of the process." See S. Franck, "Challenges Facing Investment Disputes," op. cit., p. 48. 94 In fact, Professor John Leubsdorf argues that the American Rule may have become popular in the United States after the breakdown of attorneys' fees regulation in the early nineteenth century because it was easier to administer. He claims that after the American Revolution, lawyers were no longer under government control and had the freedom to charge clients large amounts. Professor Leubsdorf concludes that without any governmental limitations on costs "the American rule became institutionalized because attorneys no longer had to push to recover their fees from the defeated party." J. For example, they may place a provision in their agreement providing for a tribunal to award costs and fees to the prevailing party in the event of a dispute. Alternatively, they may select a set of rules, such as the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, that provides that the costs of arbitration "shall in principle be borne by the unsuccessful party," while legal costs are left to the tribunal's discretion. 102 In addition, they may choose to have any disputes resolved pursuant to national laws or rules that provide for the awarding of costs and fees to the winning party. In other words, in international commercial arbitration, there is less of a concern over the need for a bright line rule because the parties can tailor the dispute to fit their particular needs or circumstances.
Similarly, in the commercial context, party autonomy would prevail over administrative efficiency. 103 That is, if parties agree that making a party whole through the CFE approach outweighs achieving any savings from the administration of the American Rule, then tribunals should respect that decision.
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In addition, in commercial contract disputes, it is perhaps easier to determine who is "the winning party" than in investment disputes, because the legal rules for determining liability and damages may be clearer than in the investment context. For example, United Nations
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG) provides detailed rules for determining whether a breach of contract has occurred and the remedies for such breach. In addition, many of these rules, including the provisions on the calculation of damages, are based on principles found in many legal systems, and thus are familiar to parties and arbitrators. For example, where the contract has been avoided because of a breach and the aggrieved party has entered into a cover transaction, CISG article 75 provides for damages to be the difference between the contract price and any cover purchase or sale. 105 If the aggrieved party did not enter into a cover transaction, CISG article 76 allows for the recovery of the difference between the market price of the goods and the contract price. 106 Both remedies are commonly found in national laws, are relatively easy to apply, and result in predictable damages.
By contrast, in investment arbitrations involving expropriations, claimants may seek to recover the value of their business that has been taken. Determining damages in this circumstance is a much more complicated process; tribunals follow no consistent set of uniform rules. Indeed, in such a situation, tribunals may use one of three methods or a combination of fair to say that the parties' autonomy to select the substantive law governing their international commercial relations is a general principle of international law that provides one of the foundations of contemporary international commercial relations."); J. Gotanda, "Awarding Interest in International Arbitration," 90 Am. J. Int'l L., p. 56 n.1 (1996) (stating that employing the parties' agreement as the primary authority "gives effect to the intent of the parties and furthers one of the fundamental characteristics of international commercial arbitration -the parties' freedom to agree upon the rules that will govern the resolution of their dispute."). them: (1) the asset-based approach; (2) the market-based approach; (3) the discounted cash flow (DCF) method. While the DCF method in theory provides an accurate method for calculating damages, in practice it can be difficult to apply because it involves determining the value of the business by projecting the net cash flows for a certain period in the future and then discounting them back to the present value as of the date of the wrongful act. This process involves many assumptions, estimates and other subjective criteria that ultimately may result in parties differing greatly on the amount of damages and decisions that seem arbitrary and inconsistent. 107 Moreover, commercial disputes, particularly those involving the CISG, tend to involve much smaller sums than investment disputes, and thus legal fees tend to be much lower. 108 And because governments acting in their sovereign capacity is not an issue, awards of costs and fees in commercial disputes tend to be less controversial.
109
V. Conclusion
In sum, my proposal advocates the adoption of the American Rule, with respect to the award of costs and fees in ICSID cases. This proposal would foster more predictable outcomes, greater administrative efficiency, and a reduction in overall costs. In addition, it would recognize that in some disputes, tribunals decide public policy issues that counsel against awarding costs and fees to the prevailing party. These reasons, however, do not apply with the same force in transnational commercial disputes. In these cases, I would give the parties the ability to agree on appropriate rules for resolving cost and fee claims, including giving the tribunal the authority to apply the CFE method.
